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For connoisseurs of legal arcana, the case of Society of Lloyd’s v Price; Society of
Lloyd’s v Lee 2006 (5) SA 393 (SCA) (hereafter Society of Lloyd’s) has a special
significance. Not only did it settle the question how best to characterize
causes of action, but it also offered a solution for that curious problem of
‘gap’. Both of these are issues arising out of conflicts of law.
In itself the conflict of laws is an abstruse discipline, for it involves not
simply the application of law to facts, but rather the application of a set of
second-order choice-of-law rules which are designed to indicate what law
should be applied to facts that happen to contain a foreign element. The
Society of Lloyd’s case, however, took matters a stage further: the logic of the
choice-of-law process drove the court to a point where it discovered that, in
the circumstances of the case, no law was applicable. In conflict jargon, this
conundrum is known as a problem of ‘gap’. (Its counterpart is ‘cumulation’,
namely the simultaneous applicability of two or more laws.)
The complex facts of the Society of Lloyd’s case were, in broad outline, as
follows. Because of adverse litigation against underwriting members (includ-
ing the respondents, Price and Lee) in the 1980s, Lloyd’s (the appellant)
adopted a ‘reconstruction and renewal’ (R & R) plan. In terms of this plan a
newly formed insurance body, Equitas Reinsurance Ltd, was to facilitate a
settlement of certain claims incurred before 1992.
In order to implement the plan and, in effect, to impose a contract with
Equitas on underwriting members, Lloyd’s used its statutory power to pass
bylaws. In any event, members had earlier entered into a standard-form
agreement obliging them to comply with any Lloyd’s subordinate legislation
and to become party to any agreement that might be prescribed. On this basis
Lloyd’s appointed a substitute agent to take over the whole or any part of a
member’s underwriting business and give effect to the R & R plan. By this
means the respondents became parties to a contract with Equitas, and
therefore liable to pay premiums. When they failed to pay, the High Court of
England and Wales awarded the appellant default judgments.
The Society of Lloyd’s then sought to enforce these judgments in South
Africa (which was the respondents’ place of residence). Price and Lee raised
three defences. First, they argued prescription under the South African
Prescription Act 68 of 1969, since the judgments had been granted more
than three years before the action had been instituted in the forum. Secondly,
they argued that the forum had no obligation to enforce the judgment
because the English court had lacked international jurisdiction; and thirdly,
they contended that the judgment had been obtained by means contravening
South African public policy.
The latter two defences concern recognition of foreign judgments rather
than choice of law, and in this regard Van Heerden JA’s decision is especially
valuable, for it contributes to the development of a sadly neglected branch of
South African law (cf the South African Law Reform Commission’s
Discussion Paper 106 (Project 121) Consolidated Legislation pertaining to
International Judicial Co-operation (2004)). Even so, her judgment need not
detain us long, since this note is mainly about choice of law and its attendant
problems of characterization and gap.
Van Heerden JA had no trouble dismissing the second and third defences.
She found that the respondents had in fact submitted to the jurisdiction of
the English courts (in clause 2.2 of the contract establishing their relation-
ship) and that, according to the ‘putative proper law’ of the contract (which
was English law), the submission was perfectly valid (para 41). As for Price
and Lee’s next argument — that the Society of Lloyd’s had created a binding
contract on its own terms, without the respondents’ consent — Van Heerden
JA found (para 45) that enforcement of foreign judgments inevitably
involved rules alien to South African law, but that mere difference was not
sufficient to warrant the forum’s refusal to enforce on policy grounds. The
further allegation — that the respondents had not been given reasonable
notice to contest the proceedings in England — was also dismissed on the
ground that it was apparent from the proceedings and from a letter written
by the respondents’ lawyers that they had in fact been given sufficient notice
(para 47).
Returning to the first defence of prescription: although the judgments had
prescribed under South African law, they had not yet prescribed under
English law, in terms of which the relevant period was six years. The
Supreme Court of Appeal was therefore presented with a typical choice-of-
law problem: should it apply South African or English law to decide the
matter? According to our conflict rules (which happen to be the same in
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English law on this point), all procedural issues must be governed by the lex
fori, whereas matters of substance are governed by the lex causae (which in
casu was English law). The court thus had to determine whether prescription
was a question of procedure or substance.
It held that, under the South African Prescription Act, our rules on
prescription are substantive, with the result that these rules could not be
applied (para 22). Under English law, on the other hand, similar rules in the
Limitation Act of 1980 are deemed procedural (although Lloyd’s argued
the contrary). South African choice-of-law rules, however, provide that the
forum may apply only the substantive laws of the lex causae, not its rules of
procedure (para 10). In consequence, neither English nor South African law
could be applied: that strange anomaly in the conflict of laws had arisen, a
‘gap’.
The Society of Lloyd’s case is not the first occasion on which our courts have
faced this problem. It occurred twenty years ago in Laconian Maritime
Enterprises Ltd v Agromar Lineas Ltd 1986 (3) SA 509 (D), a case that also
involved the question whether to apply English or South African rules on the
limitation of actions. In that case, however, the court was not fully aware of
the implications of gap. It was more concerned with an antecedent issue in
the conflict of laws, characterization, and, indeed, if we reconsider what is
being characterized, the problem of gap may be avoided (cf Jan L Neels
‘Tweevoudige leemte: Bevryende verjaring en die internasionale privaatreg’
2007 TSAR 178).
Loosely speaking, characterization (or classification) denotes the subsump-
tion of a matter under a predetermined legal category, to which the forum’s
system of private international law attaches a choice-of-law rule. The way in
which one legal system perceives and characterizes a problem is, of course,
very likely to differ from that of other legal systems. Law X, for instance, may
classify a breach of promise to marry as delictual, while law Y may classify it as
contractual. In other words, there is no universal set of legal categories
transcending particular legal regimes.
Deciding on how best to characterize is a notoriously difficult problem,
but it is critical to the choice-of-law process because until the appropriate
legal category has been determined, the forum cannot discover the relevant
choice-of-law rule, with its attached connecting factor indicating the
applicable law. (On the choice-of-law process see C F Forsyth Private
International Law 4 ed (2003) 8.) Scholars have urged one of four basic
approaches. A court may use the lex fori, the lex causae, Falconbridge’s ‘via
media’ or Kahn-Freund’s ‘enlightened lex fori’ (John D Falconbridge
‘Conflict rule and characterization of question’ (1952) 30 Canadian Bar
Review 103 at 116. See also Christopher Forsyth ‘ ‘‘Mind the gap’’: A practical
example of the characterisation of prescription/limitation rules’ (2006) 2
Journal of Private International Law 169 at 173–4 (hereafter ‘Mind the gap I’)
and Otto Kahn-Freund General Problems of Private International Law (1976)
at 227).
Until the Laconian case (supra) none of these methods was put to the test,
for the South African courts were happily innocent of the problem. A prime
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example of the early case law was Anderson v The Master 1949 (4) SA 660 (E).
Here the court simply assumed that the matter before it concerned
matrimonial property (a category determined by the lex causae). It therefore
applied the choice-of-law rule associated with that cause of action, which
was the law of the husband’s domicile at the date of marriage. (The latter rule
was confirmed by Frankel’s Estate v The Master 1950 (1) SA 220 (A).) A good
argument, however, could have been made for treating the problem as a
matter of essential validity of wills, in which case the law of the testator’s
domicile would have prevailed (C C Turpin ‘Characterization and policy in
the conflict of laws’ 1959 Acta Juridica 222 at 226).
When the South African courts later became aware of the problem of
characterization, they fell back, although usually faute de mieux, on the
time-honoured expedient of using their own law to perform the job. See, for
example, Transol Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unity; Grecian Mar SRL v MV
Andrico Unity 1989 (4) SA 325 (A) and Minister of Transport, Transkei v Abdul
1995 (1) SA 366 (N) at 370A.
The Laconian case (supra), however, was a turning point. Here the court
was fully aware of the problem of characterization, and Booysen J carefully
considered which approach to adopt. On the basis of authority and principle
he held that characterization is a process of interpretation, and that the forum
always applies its own law to interpret (at 518D). (In this regard,
Ehrenzweig’s conception of the ‘residual lex fori’ is a powerful reminder of
the realities of decision-making in conflict cases: Albert A Ehrenzweig Private
International Law (1974) 125. See, too, Society of Lloyd’s para 22.)
In Society of Lloyd’s v Price; Society of Lloyd’s v Lee 2005 (3) SA 549 (T) the
court a quo took the same approach. Mynhardt J characterized the matter in
accordance with the lex fori (para 30), supporting his judgment by reference
to the reasoning of Laconian and Abdul (supra) (paras 30 and 38 respectively),
where the courts had applied the lex fori as a residual system on the
understanding that they could not apply the procedural rules of a foreign lex
causae. On this basis Mynhardt J held that the South African Prescription Act
applied and, in consequence, the plaintiffs’ claim had prescribed.
Allowing the forum to stipulate a category without paying any regard to
other potentially applicable laws, however, may obviously distort the
choice-of-law process, not to mention suggest judicial chauvinism and even
encourage forum-shopping. Hence the argument that the lex causae should
be used to characterize. This solution, however, is logically untenable.
Although reference to a legal system that will ultimately determine the case
has a superficial attraction, it begs the question whether the lex causae should
in fact be chosen. How, in other words, can the lex causae be used to
determine its own applicability before the forum has decided whether that
law applies?
The third and fourth approaches, namely Kahn-Freund’s enlightened lex
fori (Kahn-Freund op cit 227) and Falconbridge’s via media (Falconbridge
op cit at 116) seek to take account of both the lex fori and the lex causae. (See
also ‘Mind the gap I’ at 174.) The enlightened lex fori sets out, as its title
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suggests, to introduce flexibility into a straightforward classification accord-
ing to domestic law. The forum is required to develop a set of generic
categories for use in conflict cases, not with its own law, but with foreign
concepts in mind. It is reasoned that conflict rules should always be more
enlightened if they are to do justice in a cosmopolitan world where uniform
decision-making is the ideal (Kahn-Freund op cit 228).
According to the via media, the rules of all the legal systems potentially
applicable to the case at hand must first be characterized. Only when the
forum considers itself fully informed of these rules, together with their
underlying policies, may it finally decide which to choose. In making this
decision the court is guided by its own policies and whether a rule of the lex
causae fits into the forum’s conflict of laws system (Laurens NO v Von Höhne
1993 (2) SA 104 (W) at 116E–117E). Not only does this approach take a
cosmopolitan or world-wide point of view, but it also allows for a more
flexible approach to choice of law.
The via media is, in essence, a two-stage process. First, the court must
determine ‘the legal question raised by the concrete factual situation by
reference to any potentially applicable legal system’ (Turpin op cit at 223).
This stage requires interpretation of the relevant rules of the applicable legal
systems. The second stage requires a determination whether the potentially
applicable law relates to a legal question that can be subsumed under the
forum’s conflict of laws system (ibid). The court is not obliged, however, to
accept the characterization of a foreign legal rule by the legal system to which
it belongs. Instead, the forum itself must characterize the foreign rule,
although paying attention to the purpose of that rule in its domestic context
(ibid 224).
Falconbridge’s via media is now firmly established in our law as the
preferred approach. It was employed by South African High Courts in
Laurens (supra) and Society of Lloyd’s v Romahn 2006 (4) SA 23 (C); by the
Zimbabwean High Court in Coutts & Co v Ford 1997 (1) ZLR 440 (H) at
443–5; and, of course, by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Society of
Lloyd’s case (para 14). In the latter instance Van Heerden JA supported her
decision by referring to Falconbridge, Forsyth and Laurens (para 26). She
disagreed with the trial court’s judgment (paras 23–7), and distinguished the
cases relied upon by Mynhardt J to support his finding of a ‘residual lex fori’.
In accordance with Falconbridge’s recommended method, Van Heerden
JA first used the lex fori to determine the general nature of the South African
law of prescription. Here she followed a long accepted principle, which we
borrowed from English law, whereby rules that bar a remedy are deemed
‘weak’ and therefore procedural, whereas rules that extinguish a right are
deemed ‘strong’ and therefore substantive (see Forsyth Private International
Law op cit 22). Because s 10(1) of the South African Prescription Act
extinguishes rights, Van Heerden JA found that our law was substantive, and
therefore reached a preliminary decision that the applicable law had to be the
lex causae (paras 15–16). In casu this was English law.
At this point we should note that, by a separate but seemingly parallel stage
in the choice-of-law process, the court had determined the lex causae for the
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main cause of action. Because the underlying cause in this respect was quite
obviously contractual, the applicable law was the proper law of the contract.
As it happened, the parties had expressly chosen this law in clauses 2.1 and
2.2 of their original undertaking. English law was therefore the applicable
regime (para 11).
Van Heerden JA now moved to the second stage of the via media:
characterizing the rules on prescription in accordance with the lex causae.
Here she was following an approach set out in earlier cases (see Laconian
(supra), Kühne & Nagel AG Zurich v A P A Distributors Ltd 1981 (3) SA 536
(W) and Laurens (supra). Section 24 of the English Limitation Act 1980 bars
remedies after the lapse of a certain period of time, and can therefore be
considered procedural (para 17). Because only the lex fori can govern such
matters, it followed that neither the lex causae nor the lex fori could be
applied to solve the question of prescription. The court had, in other words,
arrived at the situation of gap.
The court a quo in Society of Lloyd’s (supra) had solved this problem by
recourse to the expedient of applying the residual lex fori. A completely
different approach, however, was adopted by its counterpart in Society of
Lloyd’s v Romahn (supra), and even earlier in Coutts’s case (supra). In the
former instance Van Zyl J reasoned that ‘if a matter of procedure in the lex
causae should be a substantive matter in the lex fori, it would revert to the
lex causae’ (para 86). He held that what Forsyth subsequently dubbed a
‘residual lex causae’ was dictated by justice, fairness, reasonableness and
policy (Christopher Forsyth ‘ ‘‘Mind the gap’’ Part II: The South African
Supreme Court of Appeal and characterisation’ (2006) 2 Journal of Private
International Law 139, hereafter ‘Mind the gap II’).
Coutts’s case reached a similar conclusion on facts almost identical to those
in the Society of Lloyds. Chidyausiku J adopted the via media, welcoming the
discretion it gave him to take account of international comity, justice and
convenience (at 443–5). He ultimately selected the lex causae in preference
to the lex fori, however, because (at 445F):
‘English law allows for both the natural obligation of indebtedness to remain
intact and indeed allows a remedy. It would be most invidious were the lex fori,
which according to its own internal rules is not applicable, to subvert that
obligation and that remedy.’
In the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in Society of Lloyds, Van
Heerden JA arrived at the same conclusion — application of the lex causae
— but she adopted a somewhat different approach to solving the gap. She
also used the philosophy of the via media, and thus took account of policy
considerations (para 26), noting that she was required to be ‘sensitive to
considerations of international harmony or uniformity of decisions, as well as
the policies underlying the relevant legal rule’ (para 27). But in the final
instance, she decided to apply English law by asking whether it had the closest
and most real connection to the legal dispute (para 28). She reasoned that the
contract had stipulated English law as the system governing the creation,
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operation, interpretation and enforcement of the parties’ rights (para 30). If
both parties reasonably expected English law to govern any legal disputes,
and if the right of action had not prescribed under the English Limitation
Act, the default judgment could be enforced in South Africa.
Van Heerden JA established the via media as the only sensible solution for
issues of characterization, and found an answer to the conundrum of gap.
The learned judge is therefore to be congratulated for her contribution to the
South African conflict of laws. Nevertheless, although her decision provides
a powerful precedent for the via media, her judgment on gap merits
reconsideration: the problem can perhaps be avoided altogether.
To do so, we must begin by revisiting the process of characterization,
more especially the question of what is to be characterized. Opinion on this
matter has varied. Some claim that the facts before the court are
characterized, others the legal questions raised by the facts, and others still the
laws themselves (Forsyth Private International Law op cit 70–1; Sieg Eiselen
‘Laconian revisited — A reappraisal of classification in conflicts law’ (2006)
123 SALJ 147 at 151).
The first option (the facts) is now generally discounted. Because a category
emerges only when the potentially applicable rules have been applied to the
facts, the object of the exercise would, to all appearances at least, seem to be
rules of law (Falconbridge op cit, ‘Mind the gap I’ at 172, Laconian (supra) at
517J). With the general consensus of the common-law world to back him,
Forsyth Private International Law 70–1 endorses this conclusion (and see
‘Mind the gap I’, where he cites Laconian at 517J). He says that legal
categories, such as contract or delict, are generally considered to contain
rules, and, in the event of disputes, litigants argue in favour of rule A or rule
B, not fact A or fact B.
In the Society of Lloyd’s case Van Heerden JA also seems to have
characterized rules rather than facts. She concentrated on an analysis of the
English and South African enactments in question in order to determine
whether prescription was strong or weak (see ‘Mind the gap II’). When she
discovered that it was weak in the lex causae and strong in the lex fori, the
problem of gap emerged.
Although the case for characterization of rules seems overwhelming,
Eiselen (op cit) suggests a third and even more persuasive approach. He
argues that the process of characterizing concerns neither rules nor facts but,
instead, legal issues (at 153):
‘In any litigation . . . the disputes between the parties will generally be outlined
in the pleadings, the relief sought and the defences raised. It is ultimately the
relief sought and the defences raised that will define what the legal issues are . . .
[ie] the essential dispute between the parties. . . .’
While Eiselen concedes that the parties may rely on different rules in
different legal systems, the conflict process requires the court to assign their
dispute to a legal system as a whole. (He cites Laurens’s case at 116 as an
example.)
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In support of this argument, Eiselen refers (at 153–5) to the theoretical
basis for our choice-of-law process, pointing out that courts are not obliged
to assign a dispute to whichever rule happens to be in contention, but to a
legal system. This understanding of the way in which private international law
functions rests on a long tradition, beginning with Friedrich Carl von
Savigny’s Private International Law 2 ed (1880) (translated by W Guthrie) 68ff
and including all modern South African authors (as well as Forsyth Private
International Law op cit 44–6). In terms of this approach, the choice-of-law
process entails no more than assigning issues to legal systems in toto. Once a
court has decided on the lex causae, all relevant rules in that system are
applicable, which would include the rules on limitation of actions.
In cases of prescription, however, our courts have become used to
undertaking what amounts to a secondary characterization of the rules in the
lex causae. As Eiselen op cit points out (at 158), Cheshire and North
advocate an additional characterization to ensure that the forum applies only
the rules that its own conflict of laws permit in the circumstances of the case
(Peter M North & J J Fawcett Cheshire and North’s Private International Law
13 ed (1999) 39–40). If Van Heerden JA had simply ignored this step, she
would admittedly have arrived at the same conclusion — application of the
lex causae — and she would also have sidestepped the problem of gap.
Indeed, the issue was quite clear in the Society of Lloyd’s case: prescription of
foreign judgments. Once it was clear what law governed the award of the
judgments and the underlying rights, the same law could have been applied
to all associated issues. In fact, the line of reasoning resulting in gap seems to
begin with a separation of prescription from the main cause of action. Thus
the secondary characterization called for by Cheshire and North entails an
(arguably) unnecessary dépeçage.
There is no reason, in other words, why we should accept a characteriza-
tion of the lex causae and why we need to maintain the common-law idea
that ‘weak’ prescription is procedural and ‘strong’ prescription substantive. In
Laurens’s case (supra), for instance, Schutz J deemed rules of the lex causae to
be substantive where they did no more than bar the remedy, because that was
how they were perceived by the lex causae. (See further Forsyth Private
International Law 22n10.)
Neels proposes a complete break with all these complexities. Like Eiselen
and Van Heerden JA, he argues for application of the lex causae, but he
arrives at this position without traversing the quagmire of characterization.
Instead he suggests a much simpler expedient: a rule that the lex causae must
govern questions of prescription (Neels op cit para 15). In a meticulous study
of a variety of laws, ranging from the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (and its successor ‘Rome I’), to the
courts of Canada and Australia and the civil codes of Switzerland and Turkey,
he finds that in all these laws the lex causae of a contract governs extinctive
prescription of contractual debts (Neels paras 14.5.1–14.5.4). Support for
this rule is also available in South African academic literature (ibid para 14.7).
Neels’s approach has much to recommend it. The via media gives courts a
considerable discretion, which inevitably leads to uncertainty in choice of
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law. As Neels says, however, certainty regarding the applicable rules of
prescription is of the greatest importance (ibid para 15).
Aside from promoting certainty, Neels’ approach, at one fell swoop,
removes the problem of gap. Indeed, another value in the conflict of laws
that recommends his suggestion is simplicity. The complexities of this subject
are already sufficient to confound all but the most specialized practitioners.
Even so, Neels’s argument relies heavily on authorities relating to
prescription in contracts. What about non-contractual obligations? And, if
we are looking for a comprehensive solution to the problem of gap, what
about situations other than prescription? Although gap has occurred most
often in such cases, it seems to result from the logic of the choice-of-law
process rather than any specific rules (cf T W Bennett ‘Cumulation and gap:
Systemic problems in the conflict of laws’ (1988) 105 SALJ 444). It could
well arise, for example, in matters of capacity to commit delicts or to execute
wills and contracts (see Maryland Casualty Co v Jacek 156 F Supp 43 (1957)).
Eiselen’s approach has the merit of answering these questions. The
problem of gap can be solved by reference to the doctrinal basis for the
conflict of laws. Thus, once the forum chooses the lex causae, it then must
give effect to all the relevant the substantive and procedural rules of that
system.
There is, however, one proviso to this solution. Reference to the lex
causae should not necessarily be considered an invitation to accept the
doctrine of renvoi. In other words, reference to the lex causae as a whole
does not include reference to its choice of law rules. As it happens, the gap in
the Society of Lloyd’s case could well be regarded as an unacknowledged form
of renvoi: because the choice-of-law rules in English law provided that only
the lex fori may govern procedural issues, the matter was referred back to the
forum (which refused, however, to accept the renvoi).
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